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NOTES
Promissory Estoppel: Subcontractors' Liability in Construction
Bidding Cases
In Allen A Campbell Co., General Contractors v. Virginia Metal Indus-
tries, Inc.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed two issues that have not been resolved by North Carolina courts. Allen
M. Campbell Company sought to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel2
to recover damages from a subcontractor who refused to satisfy an oral bid.
The oral bid had been submitted to Allen M. Campbell Co., a general contrac-
tor, which relied on the oral bid in formulating the prime bid.3 Thus, the first
issue was whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel was available under
North Carolina law to create a cause of action in a construction bidding case.4
After the court of appeals found that promissory estoppel was available to the
general contractor, the second issue was whether the subcontractor's oral bid
was an unenforceable promise because it was not in writing as required by the
statute of frauds.5
This Note examines the basis for the court of appeals' holding that prom-
issory estoppel was available under North Carolina law and the extent to
which the court's decision broadened the scope of the promissory estoppel
doctrine beyond its previous application by North Carolina courts. The Note
also examines the court's conclusion that a cause of action based upon promis-
sory estoppel can overcome a defense based upon the statute of frauds.
Plaintiff Allen M. Campbell Co. was a successful bidder on a government
construction contract. 6 Defendant Virginia Metal Industries was alleged to
have quoted orally a price of $193,121 to supply all hollow metal doors and
frames required by the plans and specifications. 7 After Campbell was
awarded the contract, however, Virginia Metal refused to provide the goods in
accordance with its oral bid; Campbell subsequently was forced to purchase
the goods from another supplier for $45,562 more than the price quoted by
Virginia Metal. 8 Plaintiff brought suit based on promissory estoppel seeking
recovery of the difference between the price paid and the alleged amount of
1. 708 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1983).
2. For a definition and discussion of the doctrine of promissory estoppel see iyfra notes 24-
32 and accompanying text.
3. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 930-31.
4. North Carolina first applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel in Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co., N.A. v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749 (1982). See infra notes 99-108 and accom-
panying text.
5. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 931-32.
6. id. at 931.
7. Id. at 930.
8. Id. at 931.
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Virginia Metal's oral bid.9
Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a plaintiff may recover upon
proof that: the defendant as promisor made a promise to the plaintiff that the
defendant reasonably should have expected to induce action or forbearance on
the part of the plaintiff, and the promise in fact produced such action or for-
bearance and resulted in damage to the plaintiff.10 Campbell argued that Vir-
ginia Metal, in submitting its bid, had made a promise that it reasonably
should have expected to induce Campbell's action or forbearance. 1' Because
Campbell had relied on Virginia Metal's oral bid by incorporating that bid
into its prime bid, Campbell argued that Virginia Metal was liable for the
damages that resulted when Virginia Metal refused to perform in accordance
with its bid.12
Virginia Metal answered that North Carolina had not recognized promis-
sory estoppel as a basis for a cause of action for damages arising in a transac-
tion involving the sale of goods.13 Thus, Virginia Metal argued that it should
not be held liable to Campbell on the basis of Campbell's detrimental reliance
on the bid. Furthermore, Virginia Metal argued that Campbell had made no
promise that it would purchase the metal frames from Virginia Metal, should
Campbell's general bid be accepted.1 4 Therefore, according to defendant,
Campbell had not given consideration and no contract existed between the
two parties obliging Campbell to buy, or Virginia Metal to supply, the metal
frames at the quoted price.15 Finally, Virginia Metal contended that even if a
promise was made by Virginia Metal, that promise concerned the sale of
goods and thus was unenforceable because it was not in writing as required by
the statute of frauds provision of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).' 6
The district court dismissed the case on defendant's motion that plaintiff's
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.' 7 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the North Carolina courts would have applied the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.18 The court determined that the necessary elements of promise and
9. Id
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). For further discussion of the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel see infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
11. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings at 31, Campbell
12. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 931.
13. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 13,
Campbell.
14. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 931.
15. Id
16. Id at 932; see U.C.C. § 2-201 (1978) (codified in North Carolina at N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 25-2-201 (1965)).
17. Allen M. Campbell Co., General Contractors v. Virginia Metal Indus., Inc., No. 82-16-
CIV-4, mem. op. at 92 (E.D.N.C. filed Aug. 26, 1982), as found in Record, Allen M. Campbell
Co., General Contractors v. Virginia Metal Indus., Inc., No. 82-1845 (4th Cir. filed Dec. 20, 1982).
18. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 931. This holding was based on the recent North Carolina
Supreme Court case of Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417,293 S.E.2d 749(1982). In Rubish the court held that defendant could use promissory estoppel as a defense to
Wachovia's summary ejectment action by proving plaintiff's express or implied promise to waive
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detrimental reliance were present, and thus held that Campbell could assert
promissory estoppel in a cause of action against Virginia Metal. 19 The court
of appeals also concluded that North Carolina's doctrine of promissory estop-
pel, in appropriate cases, could withstand a statute of frauds defense and allow
a plaintiff to recover in the absence of a writing.20 Although the court ac-
knowledged a split of authority on this second issue, the court based its con-
clusion on the North Carolina Supreme Court's apparent approval of
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 139,21 which explicitly allows en-
forcement of certain promises notwithstanding the writing requirement of the
statute of frauds.22 The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district
court and remanded the case for further proceedings233
Analysis of the court of appeals' decision in Campbell requires an under-
standing of promissory estoppel and the controversies surrounding its applica-
tion.24 As now formulated, section 90 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts
states:
a written notice provision of the lease and defendant's detrimental reliance on that promise. Id. at
427, 293 S.E.2d at 756.
19. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 932.
20. Id. at 934.
21. Id The North Carolina Supreme Court had cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS, supra note 10, § 139 with approval in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Rubish, 306
N.C. at 433, 293 S.E.2d at 759. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 934.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, § 139 states:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee ... and which does induce the action or forbearance is
enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise.
23. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 934.
24. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is of relatively recent origin. For a detailed discus-
sion of the development of the doctrine of promissory estoppel see Boyer, Promissory Estoppel
Principalfrom Precedents: pt. 1, 50 MICH. L. REV. 639 (1952). The term apparently was formu-
lated by Samuel Williston, who was the Reporter for RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS. The
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS provided:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforoiment of
the promise.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1934).
The elements of promissory estoppel often are confused with the older doctrine of equitable
estoppel. 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 805 (5th ed. 1941), lists the following essential
elements of equitable estoppeh
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence--amounting to a representation
or a concealment of material facts.
2. These facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at
least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to
him.
3. The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the
benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such conduct was done, and at the time when it
was acted upon by him.
4. The conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation that it
will be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural
and probable that it will be so acted upon. There are several familiar species in which it
is simply impossible to ascribe any intention or even expectation to the party estopped that
his conduct will be acted upon by the one who afterwards claims the benefit of the
estoppel
1985]
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A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injus-
tice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.25
Thus, the doctrine of promissory estoppel renders a promise enforceable if
reliance is foreseeable and reasonable, and if injustice otherwise cannot be
avoided.26
Although acceptance of the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been
characterized as "widespread," 27 many applications of the doctrine remain
controversial. One area of controversy is the context in which the doctrine of
promissory estoppel can be invoked. Some courts have held that promissory
estoppel only can be asserted defensively, as when a promisor seeks to assert
and enforce a legal right that he previously has promised to forego and the
promisee has relied detrimentally upon that promise.28 The majority of courts
addressing the issue, however, have upheld the use of promissory estoppel as a
means of seeking affirmative relief when a promise has been made that the
promisee relied on to his detriment in such a manner as to make it unjust not
to enforce the promise.29 Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90 sup-
5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must be
led to act upon it.
6. He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse;
in other words, he must so act that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled to surren-
der or forego or alter what he has done by reason of the first party being permitted to
repudiate his conduct and to assert rights inconsistent with it.
In general, the most significant factor distinguishing equitable estoppel and promissory estop-
pel is that equitable estoppel requires the party asserting the doctrine to prove that the party to be
estopped actually misrepresented a material, present fact. In promissory estoppel, the major dis-
tinguishing characteristic is that a promise can pertain to a future fact or action. Annot., 56
A.L.R.3d 1037, 1046 (1974).
The doctrine of promissory estoppel originally was limited to gratuitous promises. Applica-
tion of the doctrine, however, has been expanded to include the field of bargain transactions. See
Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 344 (1969).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, § 90. For a discussion of the
significance of the revisions made in § 90 by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS see
Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Prolferation o/Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM.
L. RaV. 52 (1981).
26. Henderson, supra note 24, at 346.
27. Knapp, supra note 25, at 54.
28. See, e.g., Farmland Serv. Coop., Inc. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 544, 244 N.W.2d 86, 90
(1976). The following hypothetical provides an example of the use of promissory estoppel in the
defensive context. Landlord informs tenant that oral notification of intent to renew a lease will be
accepted, contrary to a term in the lease requiring written notice of intent to renew the lease.
Tenant, relying on the promise, provides landlord with oral notice of intent to renew the lease. If
the landlord later tries to evict tenant for failure to provide written notice of renewal as required
by the lease, tenant can assert the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The landlord will be estopped
from asserting a right (written notice) that he previously had promised to forego. See also Union
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544 (1877); Southeastern Sales and Serv. Co. v. T.T. Watson,
Inc., 172 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Essley, 173 Okla. 2, 46 P.2d
462 (1935); McCurty v. Piedmont Mut. Ins. Co., 81 S.C. 152, 62 S.E. 1 (1908); Elliot v. Whitmore,
23 Utah 342, 65 P. 70 (1901); Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037, 1047-48 (1974).
29. See Annot., 56 A.L.R. 1037, 1047-49; 28 AM. JuR. 2D, supra note 28. For examples of the
affirmative use of promissory estoppel to create a cause of action, see infra note 30.
[Vol. 63
ESTOPPEL IN CONSTRUCTION BIDDING
ports this majority view.30
The application of promissory estoppel in construction bidding cases also
is controversial. 3 1 Typically, the problem arises when a subcontractor submits
the low bid to a general contractor, which then includes that low bid in the
general contractor's prime bid for a project. The general contractor is in no
position to "accept" the subcontractor's bid, however, until his own bid is ac-
cepted. The subcontractor then attempts to withdraw his bid after the general
contractor has relied on the bid but before he has accepted it. If the general
contractor is awarded the contract and is unable to find another subcontractor
willing to perform the job for the same price as the original subcontractor's
bid, he sues, based on promissory estoppel, to recover the difference between
the original subcontractor's bid and the price the general contractor must pay
to have the job done.32
Courts confronted with construction bidding cases have adopted two dif-
ferent methods of analysis, with opposite results.33 Courts rejecting the use of
the doctrine of promissory estoppel have based their conclusions on traditional
contract principles.34 These courts reason that submission of a bid for a sub-
30. Nothing in the language of§ 90 limits its application to defensive situations in which the
romisor seeks to assert a legal right that he promised to abandon. Further, comments a and b of
90 contain illustrations that encompass both defensive and offensive uses of promissory estoppel.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, § 90 comment a, illustration 1, states:
1. A, knowing that B is going to college, promises B that A will give him $5,000 on
completion of his course. B goes to college, and borrows and spends more than $5,000
for college expenses. When he has nearly completed his course, A notifies him of an
intention to revoke the promise. A's promise is binding and B is entitled to payment on
completion of the course without regard to whether his performance was "bargained for"
under § 71.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, § 90 comment b, illustrations 2-4, state:
2. A promises B not to foreclose, for a specified time, a mortgage which A holds on B's
land. B thereafter makes improvements on the land. A's promise is binding and may be
enforced by denial of foreclosure before the time has elapsed.
3. A sues B in a municipal court for damages for personal injuries caused by B's negli-
gence. After the one year statute of limitations has run, B requests A to discontinue the
action and start again in the superior court where the action can be consolidated with
other actions against B arising out of the same accident. A does so. B's implied promise
that no harm to A will result bars B from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense.
4. A has been employed by B for 40 years. B promises to pay A a pension of $200 per
month when A retires. A retires and forbears to work elsewhere for several years while B
pays the pension. B's promise is binding.
31. For a detailed analysis of the issues involved in construction bidding cases, see Schultz,
The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L.
REv. 237 (1952); Note, Once Around the Flag Pole: Construction Bidding and Contracts at Forma-
lion, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 816 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Note, Flag Pole]; Comment, Construction
Bidding Probler Is There a Solution Fair to Both the General Contractor and Subcontractor, 19
ST. Louis U.L.J. 552 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Construction Bidding]; Comment, Bid
Shopping and Peddling in the Subcontractor Construction Industry, 18 UCLA L. REv. 389 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Bid Shopping]; Note, The Problem of Offer andAcceptance in the
General Contractor.Subcontractor Relationship, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 798 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Offer andAcceptance]; Note, The "Firm Offer"Problem in Construction Bids and the Needfor
Promissory Estoppel, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 212 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Firm
Offer].
32. See Comment, Construction Bidding, supra note 31, at 553-54.
33. Id at 552, 553.
34. See id. at 552. Using traditional contract analysis the court will examine the facts to
determine if the essential elements of a bargain transaction, including a valid acceptance, mutual
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contract is an offer that can be withdrawn at any time before it is accepted.
Therefore, a subcontractor is free to withdraw his bid at any time prior to
acceptance by the general contractor and is not liable for any damages to the
general contractor resulting from revocation of the bid.3 5
The leading case adopting this line of reasoning is James C. Baird Co. v.
Gimbel Brother,36 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. In Baird Judge Learned Hand concluded that the general con-
tractor's use of the subcontractor's bid in his prime bid did not constitute
acceptance of the offer so as to form a contract.37 The court also rejected the
use of promissory estoppel in the context of a bargaining transaction.38
More recently courts have accepted and applied the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel in construction bidding cases.39 These courts have applied the
doctrine of promissory estoppel to hold the subcontractor liable to the general
contractor if the subcontractor refuses to perform according to his bid and the
general contractor suffers damages as a result.
The leading case in this line is Drennan v. Star Paving Co.,40 a 1958 Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decision. The facts of Drennan were similar to those in
Campbell: a general contractor sought to recover damages from a subcontrac-
tor who had refused to perform according to a bid submitted to the general
contractor.4 1 In Drennan Justice Traynor agreed with Judge Hand's opinion
in Bairdthat use of a bid by the general contractor is not sufficient acceptance
of the offer to create a contract.42 Unlike Judge Hand, however, Justice Tray-
nor concluded that "[r]easonable reliance resulting in a foreseeable prejudicial
change in position affords a compelling basis . . . for implying a subsidiary
promise not to revoke an offer for a bilateral contract. '4 3 He concluded that
"absence of consideration is not fatal to the enforcement of such a promise" 44
assent, and consideration, are present. If any of these elements are missing, no contract has been
formed. In contrast, enforcement of a promise through promissory estoppel is based on reliance,
not on the elements of bargain or exchange.
35. James C. Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933); Mitchell v. Siquerios, 99
Idaho 396, 399-401, 582 P.2d 1074, 1077-79 (1978); K.L. House Constr. Co. v. Watson, 84 N.M.
783, 508 P.2d 592 (1973); Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 76 N.M. 729, 732-34, 418 P.2d
187, 189-90 (1966).
36. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
37. Id at 346; see I A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 51 (1st ed. 1963); S. WILLISTON,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 139 (3d ed. 1957). For criticism of Bairdsee Note, Flag Pole, supra
note 31, at 821.
38. Baird, 64 F.2d at 346.
39. Two early cases recognizing the use of promissory estoppel in the context of construction
bidding are Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654, 660-61 (7th Cir. 1941)
(recognizing the availability of promissory estoppel, but refusing to apply the doctrine because
"the promisee has failed to show irreparable detriment"), and Northwestern Eng'g Co. v. Eller-
man, 69 S.D. 397, 406-08, 10 N.W.2d 879, 883-84 (1943) (awarding damages to the general con-
tractor after step-by-step application of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 24,§ 90).
40. 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
41. Id. at 411-13, 333 P.2d at 758-59.
42. Id at 413, 333 P.2d at 759.
43. Id at 414, 333 P.2d at 760.
44. Id
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because "[r]easonable reliance serves to hold the offeror in lieu of the consider-
ation ordinarily required to make the offer binding."4 5
Subsequent cases have clarified the elements necessary to support a cause
of action based on promissory estoppel in construction bidding cases. 46 Four
requirements generally are cited. First, the subcontractor promisor must have
made an affirmative promise to do something.4 7 Second, the general contrac-
tor promisee must demonstrate that his reliance was reasonably foreseeable.48
Third, the reliance must be justifiable.49 Last, substantial detriment must re-
sult from the reliance if the promise is not enforced.50 Section 87(2) of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, in essence a codification of the Drennan
holding, provides additional support for the application of promissory estop-
pel in construction bidding cases.5 '
A few jurisdictions continue to follow traditional contract analysis in con-
struction bidding cases, and allow a subcontractor to revoke his bid at any
time before the general contractor accepts it.5 2 The majority of jurisdictions,
however, have followed Drennan and its progeny and have applied promissory
estoppel to bind a subcontractor to perform in accordance with his bid, once
the general contractor has relied on that bid by incorporating it into his prime
bid.53 In these jurisdictions, a subcontractor's offer is rendered irrevocable for
a reasonable period after the general contractor has detrimentally relied on
that bid.54
45. Id (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 24, § 90).
46. See N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Construc-
tors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, 291 Minn. 113, 190 N.W.2d 71 (1971).
47. N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
48. Id
49. Id
50. Id.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, § 87(2) states: "An offer which
the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on
the part of the offeree before acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding as an option contract to the extent necessary to avoid injustice."
Furthermore, the Drennan fact situation is used as one of six illustrations of the section.
Comment e, illustration 6 to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, § 87(2),
reads as follows:
A submits a written offer for paving work to be used by B as a partial basis for B's bid as
general contractor on a large building. As A knows, B is required to name his subcon-
tractors in his general bid. B uses A's offer and B's bid is accepted. A's offer is irrevoca-
ble until B has had a reasonable opportunity to notify A of the award and B's acceptance
of A's offer.
52. See supra note 35.
53. See, e.g., Montgomery Indus. Int'l v. Thomas Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1980);
Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976); Debron Corp. v. Na-
tional Homes Constr. Corp., 493 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1974); Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 237
Ark. 583, 374 S.W.2d 818 (1964); Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Eng'g Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 95, 92
Cal. Rptr. 799 (1971); Norcross v. Winters, 209 Cal. App. 2d 207, 25 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1962); Jaybe
Constr. Co. v. Beco, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 406, 216 A.2d 208 (1965); Nielson v. National Heat &
Power Co., 32 Ill. App. 3d 941, 337 N.E.2d 387 (1975); Lyon Metal Prods. v. Hagerman Constr.
Corp., 181 Ind. App. 336, 391 N.E.2d 1152 (1979); Constructors Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet
Metal Works, 291 Minn. 113, 190 N.W.2d 71 (1971); E.A. Coronis Assocs. v. M. Gordon Constr.
Co., 90 NJ. Super. 69, 216 A.2d 246 (1966); Wargo Builders, Inc. v. Douglas L. Cox Plumbing &
Heating, Inc., 26 Ohio App. 2d 1, 268 N.E.2d 597 (1971).
54. Drennan, 51 Cal. 2d at 413-14, 333 P.2d at 759-60.
1985]
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Critics contend that the availability of a cause of action based on promis-
sory estoppel in a construction bidding case creates the potential for injustice
between a general contractor and a subcontractor.5 5 Although the subcontrac-
tor is obligated to perform if the general contractor incorporates his bid into
the prime bid, the general contractor is not obligated to award the job to the
subcontractor who submitted the bid.5 6 Thus, the general contractor might
attempt to delay acceptance of the subcontractor's bid after receiving the
prime contract in hopes of getting a better price through postaward negotia-
tions with various subcontractors. 57 To prevent the general contractor from
delaying acceptance of the subcontractor's bid to seek a better price, however,
it is only necessary that the general contractor be required to accept the sub-
contractor's bid within a reasonable period after being awarded the prime
bid.5 8
Although promissory estoppel creates the potential for abuse by the gen-
eral contractor, the case law indicates that courts are aware of the potential
abuses59 and scrutinize the facts of each case. Courts have refused to apply
the doctrine of promissory estoppel in cases in which the equities lie with the
subcontractor.60 Some courts have refused to apply promissory estoppel when
the subcontractor's bid was so "glaringly low" as to put the general contractor
on notice that a mistake had been made.61 In such cases courts view the gen-
eral contractor's reliance on the bid as unreasonable. 62
In summary, although some courts have rejected the use of promissory
estoppel to render a subcontractor's bid irrevocable for a period of time under
any circumstances, 63 the majority accept the doctrine as embodied in Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts sections 87(2) and 90. Thus, a subcontractor's bid
is rendered irrevocable if the general contractor has detrimentally relied on the
55. See, e.g., Comment, Construction Bidding, supra note 31, at 563-66; Comment, Bid Shop-
ping, suipra note 31; Note, Offer and Acceptance, supra note 31.
56. Note, Offer andAcceptance, supra note 31, at 812-13.
57. Various types of unethical trade practices used by general contractors to obtain lower
subcontract prices are defined and discussed in Comment, Construction Bidding, supra note 31, at
564-65.
58. See Drennan, 51 Cal. App. 2d at 415, 333 P.2d at 760 (1958) (A general contractor is "not
free to delay acceptance after he has been awarded the general contract in the hope of getting a
better price. Nor can he reopen bargaining with the subcontractor and at the same time claim a
continuing right to accept the original offer.").
59. In N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the court
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the general contractor when, after having received the
prime contract award, the general contractor sent the subcontractor a proposed subcontract con-
taining terms previously not discussed by the parties. The court ruled that when the proposed
subcontract adds conditions, it becomes a counteroffer and is not effective as an acceptance. Id at
738; see also RJ. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952) (proposed sub-
contract containing additional specifications constitutes a counteroffer, not an acceptance).
60. Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941); Edward Joy Co.
v. Noise Control Prods., Inc., 111 Misc. 2d 64, 443 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1981); Union Tank Car Co. v.
Wheat Bros., 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (1964).
61. Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1941).
62. See also supra note 35 and accompanying text (courts that have refused to apply a prom-
issory estoppel test).
63. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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bid and injustice otherwise cannot be avoided.64 The courts, however, have
tended to apply the doctrine flexibly, considering the facts and equities in each
case before allowing promissory estoppel to render the subcontractor's bid
irrevocable.65
Another controversial and unsettled issue is whether promissory estoppel
can be used to avoid the writing requirement of the statute of frauds. Al-
though Restatement (First) of Contracts made no reference to the effect of
promissory estoppel on the statute of frauds, 66 the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts explicitly allows promissory estoppel to overcome the requirements
of the statute of frauds if certain requirements are satisfied.67
64. See generally Note, The Firm Offer, supra note 31, at 220-23 (discussing recent develop-
ments in use of promissory estoppel to avoid injustice in construction bidding process).
65. For a discussion of the growth of the use of promissory estoppel as a means of defeating
the Statute of Frauds, see Note, Promissory Estopfpel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of Frauds,
44 FoRDHAM L. REv. 114 (1975). For an earlier discussion advocating the use of estoppel to
overcome the statute of frauds, see Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of
Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 440 (1931).
66. Since the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 24, made no reference to the
effect of promissory estoppel on the statute of frauds, a promise made binding by RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, § 90, arguably still must meet the statute of frauds writ-
ing requirement before it can be enforced. See Note, supra note 65, at 116. RESTATEMENT
(FIRsT) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 24, § 178, however, contained language that permitted a lim-
ited application of estoppel to overcome the statute of frauds. Comment f to § 178 stated:
Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute, an estoppel may preclude objection
on that ground in the same way that objection to the non-existence of other facts essen-
tial for the establishment of a right or a defence [sic] may be precluded. . . . [A] prom-
ise to make a memorandum, if. . . relied on, may give rise to an effective promissory
estoppel if the Statute would otherwise operate to defraud.
RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 24, § 178 comment f. Citing comment f, courts
often have refused to allow promissory estoppel to overcome the statute of frauds when the prom-
isee did not rely on an ancillary promise by the promisor to put their agreement in writing. See
C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1977); Alaska Airlines v.
Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir. 1954); Rockland Indus. v. Frank Kasmir Assocs., 470 F.
Supp. 1176, 1180 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Ivey's Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. Petrochem Maintenance, Inc.,
463 F. Supp. 543, 552-54 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 16 Ariz.
App. 415, 420-21, 493 P.2d 1220, 1225-26 (1972); H. Molsen & Co. v. Hicks, 550 S.W.2d 354, 356
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Klinke v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 255, 259-60,
616 P.2d 644, 647 (1980) (en banc). For criticism of the leading case applying RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 24, § 178, in a construction bidding case, see Comment, Prime
Contractor's Reliance on Supplier's Bid Does Not Estop Supplier from Raising Statute of Frauds
Defense under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-201, 9 RUT.-CAm. L. REv. 387 (1978) (discuss-
ing C.R. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1977)).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, contains significant changes in
sections dealing with estoppel and the statute of frauds. Section 178, comment f of RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 24, was dropped in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS.
Section 178 of RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACrs was renumbered as § 110 in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, and a new comment d was added. Comment d acknowledges that
"circumstances may be such that justice requires enforcement of the promise. To the extent that
justice so requires, the promise is then enforced by virtue of the doctrine of estoppel or by virtue of
reliance on a promise notwithstanding the Statute." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
§ 110 comment d.
The second and more significant change from RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra
note 24, to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, is the addition of § 139,
which expressly sanctions the use of promissory estoppel to overcome the statute of frauds. Sec-
tion 139 states:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance on the part of the promisee. . . and which does induce the action or forbearance is
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This issue becomes more complicated, however, when an agreement per-
tains to the sale of goods and therefore is subject to the provisions of the
UCC.68 Section 2-201, the statute of frauds provision of the UCC 6 9 requires
enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise ....
(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise,
the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation and
restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation to
the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence of the mak-
ing and terms of the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise established by clear
and convincing evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance was forseeable by the promisor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, § 139. See Knapp, supra note 25, at 67-
71, for a discussion of the significance of the revisions made in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or
CONTRACTS. Comment b of § 139 states:
Like § 90 this Section states a flexible principle, but the requirement of consideration is
more easily displaced than the requirement of a writing. The reliance must be foresee-
able by the promisor, and enforcement must be necessary to avoid injustice. Subsection
(2) lists some of the relevant factors in applying the latter requirement,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, § 139 comment b. Some courts consider-
ing the issue of whether promissory estoppel can be used to avoid the statute of frauds have
adopted the position of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. See McIntosh v. Murphy,
52 Hawaii 29, 35-57, 469 P.2d 177, 181 (1970); Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274
N.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Iowa 1979) (en banc); Walker v. Ireton, 221 Kan. 314,321-22, 559 P,2d 340,
345-46 (1977); Remilong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461, 465 (Wyo. 1978). But see McDabo, Inc. v. Chet
Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456, 460-61 (D.S.C. 1982) (promissory estoppel claim not recognized on
grounds that judicially created exception to statute of frauds would nullify it); Lige Dickson Co. v.
Union Oil Co., 96 Wash. 2d 291,299-300, 635 P.2d 103, 107 (1981) (en banc) (adoption of promis-
sory estoppel would erode UCC and result in increased litigation and confusion). The North
Carolina Supreme Court recently addressed the issue and cited § 139 with approval in Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Rubish, 306 N.C. 417, 433, 293 S.E.2d 749, 759 (1982). Many jurisdic-
tions, however, have not considered the issue. Other jurisdictions, in the past having adopted the
position of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 24, have not addressed the issue
since the adoption of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10. See supra note
66 and accompanying text. As a result, many jurisdictions still follow the rule of RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 24, and limit the use of promissory estoppel to situations in
which an ancillary promise was made to fulfill the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds,
68. The two relevant sections of the Uniform Commercial Code are § 2-201 (the statute of
frauds) and § 1-103 (the availability of equitable principles to supplement specific Code provi-
sions). U.C.C. § 2-201 (1976) states:
Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds
(I) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for
the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term
agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quan-
tity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of
the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such
party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after it is
received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which
is valid in other respects is enforceable
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that a contract for the sale of goods involving $500 or more be in writing. 70 In
addition, section 2-201 enumerates three specific exceptions to the writing re-
quirement of the statute of frauds for situations in which various actions of the
parties provide evidence of the transaction.7 1
The statute of frauds provision of the UCC, like its predecessors under
the Uniform Sales Act 72 and the original statute of frauds pertaining to the
sale of goods,73 was enacted to prevent the enforcement of fraudulent con-
tracts to which the parties may not have assented.74 Also like its predecessors,
the UCC statute of frauds provision is subject to the criticism that it can be
used to perpetrate fraud.7 5 When clear evidence of an agreement exists, but
the evidence fails to conform to the requirements of the statute or its excep-
tions, one party can use the statute of frauds to avoid performance. Applica-
tion of the statute in such a case results in injury to the party who
detrimentally relied on the agreement. 76
Historically, courts have recognized that strict enforcement of the statute
of frauds may assist the perpetration of fraud.77 As a result, courts have
turned to the doctrine of estoppel as one means of mitigating the harsh results
of strict enforcement of the statute of frauds.78 Case law is divided, however,
as to whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be used to overcome the
general statute of frauds.79 The controversy continues as courts have at-
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the
seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which
reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substan-
tial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading,
testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the con-
tract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods ad-
mitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or
which have been received and accepted (See. 2-206).
U.C.C. § 1-103 (1976) states: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the princi-
ples of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or
other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."
69. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1976).
70. Id. § 2-201(1).
71. Id. § 2-201(3). For the text of this section see supra note 68.
72. Uniform Sales Act § 4 (1906).
73. 29 Car. 2, c.3, § 17 (1677).
74. Edwards, The Statute of Frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Doctrine of
Estoppel, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 205, 207-09, 213-14 (1978).
75. See, e.g., . WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-8 (2d ed. 1980); Metzger & Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Section 2-201 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 VILL. L. REv. 63, 66-67 (1980).
76. Metzger & Phillips, supra note 75, at 66-67.
77. Edwards, supra note 74, at 214-16; see also Burdick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16
COLUm. L. REv. 273 (1916) (arguing that the statute of frauds may promote fraud by encouraging
parties to deny the existence of obligations rather than meet them).
78. Edwards, supra note 74, at 214; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 75, at 63. For North
Carolina cases supporting the use of equitable estoppel to overcome the statute of frauds, see infra
note 121.
79. The original statute of frauds contained twenty-five sections, two of which applied to
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tempted to determine if estoppel can overcome a statute of frauds defense
under section 2-201 of the UCC.
With respect to this issue, section 1-103 of the UCC provides that "unless
displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
equity, including. . . the law relative to. . .estoppel. . . shall supplement
its provisions." 80 Section 1-103 does not indicate, however, how to determine
whether the equitable principles have been displaced by particular provisions
of the Code. Section 2-201 also does not state specifically whether estoppel is
displaced by its specific provisions. Thus, neither section 1-103 nor section 2-
201 provides any guidance as to whether estoppel doctrine can be used to
overcome the requirements of the statute of frauds.81
Courts faced with the issue of whether section 1-103's estoppel principle
may operate as an exception to the statute of frauds generally have taken one
of two positions. The minority postion is that estoppel cannot create an excep-
tion to the requirements of the statute of frauds.82 Courts adopting this posi-
tion hold that the only exceptions to the UCC statute of frauds are those
specifically enumerated in section 2-201.83 These courts reason that if the leg-
islature had intended the list of exceptions in section 2-201 merely to be sug-
gestive and not exclusive, the section would have been worded accordingly. 84
The statute of frauds reflects a legislative policy encouraging parties to put
their agreements in writing;85 therefore, allowing a party to circumvent the
statute of frauds' writing requirement through the use of estoppel is contrary
contracts. 29 Car. 2, c.3, §§ 4, 17 (1677). Section 4 applied to contracts other than for the sale of
goods. Such contracts include: contracts of an executor or administrator to pay damages out of
his own estate, contracts to pay the debts of another, contracts made in consideration of marriage,
contracts for the sale of lands, and contracts not to be performed within one year. Id § 4. Section
17 referred specifically to contracts for the sale of goods, and was incorporated into later statutes
of frauds in the United States. Edwards, supra note 74, at 207-08.
In 1906 these statutes were replaced by § 4 of the Uniform Sales Act, which applied to sales
of goods worth $500 or more. Id at 208. Section 4 of the Uniform Sales Act was replaced by
U.C.C. § 2-201 (1976), which also applied to contracts for the sale of goods worth $500 or more,
Id at 208.
North Carolina's general statute of frauds, which does not apply to sales of goods, is con-
tained in N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 22-1 to 22-4 (1965). It covers several types of contracts included in
the original statute of frauds. See, e.g., id. § 22-1 (contracts to pay for the debts of another); Id.§ 22-2 (contracts for the sale of land); id. § 22-4 (contracts to pay a debt discharged by a bank-
ruptcy decree). The UCC statute of frauds, applying to sales of goods for $500 or more, is codified
at N.C. GaN. STAT. § 25-2-201 (1965).
80. See supra note 68 for the complete text of U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
81. See Edwards, supra note 74, at 219-24.
82. See, e.g., Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 289 So. 2d 609 (1974); C.G. Campbell & Son, Inc. v.
Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). The following hypothetical illustrates the
results of the minority rule. A seller orally agrees to the sale of certain goods to a buyer who relies
on the promise by reselling the goods. If the seller later refuses to perform accordin4 to the oral
agreement, the statute of frauds bars enforcement of that agreement and the court will not allow
the buyer to use the doctrine of promissory estoppel to escape the writing requirement of the
statute of frauds.
83. See, e.g., McDabco Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456, 461 (D.S.C. 1982); Cox v.
Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 111, 289 So. 2d 609, 613 (1974); C.G. Campbell & Son, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp.,
586 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Farmland Serv. Coop., Inc. v. Klein, 196 Neb. 538, 544,
244 N.W.2d 86, 90 (1976).
84. See C.G. Campbell & Son, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40,41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
85. See McDabco, Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456, 461 (D.S.C. 1982). See gener-
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to the intent of the legislature.86
Courts adopting this position acknowledge that strict enforcement of the
statute of frauds can result in injustice when clear evidence of an oral agree-
ment exists and one party has detrimentally relied on that agreement. These
courts argue that the injured party willingly assumed a risk in relying on an
oral promise.8 7 Furthermore, these courts argue that the few unjust results are
outweighed by the benefits of strict application of the statute of frauds.88
The second position, adopted by a majority of courts, is that the estoppel
principles of section 1-103 can operate as an exception to the statute of frauds
provision of 2-201.89 Under this view, section 2-201 is not interpreted to have
displaced equitable principles simply because the section does not make any
reference to their availability.90 Courts take the position that because section
2-201 does not prohibit specifically the use of equitable principles, the general
provisions of section 1-103, including estoppel, are available as exceptions.91
The exceptions explicitly enumerated in 2-201 therefore were not intended to
be exclusive. This view is consistent with the primary function of the statute of
frauds-to require independent evidence of a bona fide transaction. Because
reliance on an oral contract provides such independent evidence, dispensing
with the writing requirement in promissory estoppel cases does not undercut
the statute's purpose.92 Furthermore, although the purpose of the UCC was to
bring uniformity and predictability to commercial law, the drafters did not
intend for the UCC to create a rigid system that perpetuates injustice and in-
equitable results through strict application of the statute of frauds.93
Although a majority of courts have held that equitable provisions embod-
ied in section 1-103 may override the writing requirement of the statute of
ally J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 75, § 2-8 (discussing various rationales for the statute of
frauds).
86. McDabco, Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456, 461 (D.S.C. 1982); C.G. Campbell
& Son, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Anderson Constr. Co. v.
Lyon Metal Prods., Inc., 370 So. 2d 935, 937 (Miss. 1979) (quoting Thomas v. Prewitt, 355 So. 2d
657, 661 (Miss. 1978)); Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 96 Wash. 2d 291, 299-300, 635 P.2d
103, 107 (1981).
87. See, e.g., Farmers Coop. Elevator Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808, 812 (N.D. 1976) (quot-
ing Ozier v. Haines, 411 I. 160, 164-65, 103 N.E.2d 485, 488 (1952)).
88. Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Iowa 1979) (Reynoldson,
C.J., dissenting).
89. See Ralston Purina Co. v. McCollum, 611 S.W.2d 201 (Ark. Ct. App. 1971); Warder &
Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1979); Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator
v. Johnson, 305 Minn. 324, 232 N.W.2d 921 (1975); Del Haynes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 304
Minn. 275, 230 N.W.2d 588 (1975); Farmers Coop. Elevator Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D.
1976); Potter v. Hatter Farms, Inc., 56 Or. App. 254, 641 P.2d 628 (1982); Farmers Elevator Co. v.
Lyle, 90 S.D. 86, 238 N.W.2d 290 (1976).
90. Potter v. Hatter Farms, Inc., 56 Or. App. 254, 641 P.2d 628, 632 (1982).
91. Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Iowa 1979).
92. Summers, General Equitable Princples Under Section 1-103 ofthe Unform Commercial
Code, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 906, 941-42 (1978).
93. Potter v. Hatter Farms, Inc. 56 Or. App. 254, 641 P.2d 628, 633 (1982); see also Corbin,
The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, Should It be Enacted, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 829 (1950) ("The
purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent the enforcement of alleged promises that never were
made; it is not, and never has been, to justify contractors in repudiating promises that were in fact
made.").
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frauds, much controversy exists about what type of estoppel may be invoked.
This conflict arises because section 1-103 does not define specifically what type
of estoppel is included in its provisions.94 Thus, some jurisdictions allow equi-
table estoppel but not promissory estoppe195 to overcome the statute of
frauds.96 The issue is muddled further by judicial confusion about the essen-
tial elements of promissory estoppel.97 As a result, the holdings in cases ad-
dressing the issue are inconsistent and fail to set forth dependable guidelines.98
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the application of promissory
estoppel in construction bidding cases is plagued by conflicting precedent and
case law. In Campbellthe court of appeals attempted to resolve these contro-
versial issues as it believed the North Carolina Supreme Court would. Be-
cause there was little guidance in North Carolina case law, the court found its
task complicated further.
The first issue raised in Campbell was whether promissory estoppel is
available under North Carolina law to render the subcontractor's bid irrevoca-
ble. This issue had not been addressed by the North Carolina courts. Until
the recent case of Wachovia Bank and Trust Company, N.A. v. Rubish,99 the
North Carolina Supreme Court never had accepted expressly promissory es-
toppel and had mentioned the doctrine in dicta only twice. The two refer-
ences in dicta indicated neither acceptance nor rejection of the doctrine. 100
The Rubish court for the first time expressly accepted promissory estop-
94. See supra note 68 for the full text of U.C.C. § 1-103 (1976).
95. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for definitions of promissory and equitable
estoppel.
96. Farmers Coop. Elevator Ass'n of Churchs Ferry v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1976)(plaintiff failed to establish promissory estoppel; courts may be reluctant to find estoppel when
another doctrine suffices); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Lyle, 90 S.D. 86, 94, 238 N.W.2d 240, 294(1976) (only equitable estoppel may overcome the statute of frauds).
97. An example of judicial confusion over the distinction between equitable and promissory
estoppel is seen in a line of South Dakota cases in which the court applies several different and
incorrect definitions to the terms "promissory estoppel" and "equitable estoppel." See Farmers
Elevator Co. v. Lyle, 90 S.D. 86, 91-92, 238 N.W.2d 290, 294 (1976); Kelly v. Gram, 73 S.D. 11,
24-25, 38 N.W.2d 460, 466-67 (1949); Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Matson, 68 S.D. 538, 541-
42, 5 N.W.2d 314, 315 (1942); see also Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373, 378 (N.D. 1974)(the court cited RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 24, § 90, while purporting to
define equitable estoppel in a manner indistinguishable from promissory estoppel).
98. For example, in construction bidding cases involving both "goods" and "services" and
decided without reference to the UCC, California case law allows promissory estoppel to over-
come the statute of frauds. See Saliba-Kringlen Corp. v. Allen Eng'g Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 95, 106,
92 Cal. Rptr. 799, 808 (1971).
99. 306 N.C. 417, 293 S.E.2d 749 (1982).
100. In Clement v. Clement, 230 N.C. 636,55 S.E.2d 459 (1949), the promisor bad promised to
forego interest on a loan contrary to the agreement made at the time of the loan. Later the prom-
isor sued for the interest according to the original agreement. The court acknowledged the exist-
ence of the doctrine of promissory estoppel based on RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra
note 24, § 90. The court, however, found the doctrine of estoppel inapplicable because the prom-
isee had not suffered substantial detriment as a result of reliance on the promise. Therefore, the
court concluded that a waiver of a legal right that is to be or may be asserted in the future, when
the waiver cannot operate as an estoppel, requires consideration as much as any agreement by any
other name. In Tatum v. Brown, 29 N.C. App. 504, 224 S.E.2d 698 (1976), plaintiff brought suit
for lost salary alleging that in reliance on defendant's promise of employment she resigned her job
and subsequently defendant revoked the job offer. The court stated without discussion that the
doctrine of promissory estoppel did not apply in this action for breach of employment contract.
[Vol. 63
ESTOPPEL IN CONSTRUCTION BIDDING
pel 10 In Rubish, plaintiff, as trustee, sought to evict defendant, a tenant, for
defendant's failure to give written notice of renewal as required by his lease. 102
The jury found that plaintiff had waived the requirement of written notice and
ruled in defendant's favor. 103
On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court was presented with two
issues: whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's assertion
of waiver and estoppel; and whether the jury had been instructed properly on
these issues. 1°4 The court found that the jury had been instructed improperly
on the issues and that the evidence did not support the finding that plaintiff
had waived the notice requirement.' 05 The court did find evidence, however,
from which the jury could have found, based on the promissory estoppel the-
ory, that plaintiff was estopped from demanding written notice. 10 6 The Rubish
court held that to assert a defense based on promissory estoppel defendant had
to prove that plaintiff had expressly or impliedly promised to waive the written
notice provision and that defendant had detrimentally relied on the prom-
ise. 107 The supreme court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial to
determine whether plaintiff was estopped from demanding written notice
based on promissory estoppel theory.' 08
Relying on Rubish, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held in Campbell that North Carolina law recognizes the doctrine of
promissory estoppel.19 The court quoted extensively from Rubish, but did not
analyze the holding except to note the distinction between equitable estoppel
and promissory estoppel.110 The court of appeals did not set forth its own list
of the necessary elements of promissory estoppel, but cited those in Rubish."II
Apparently, the necessary elements were an express or implied promise and
detrimental reliance on that promise.
The court of appeals did not recognize that the application of promissory
estoppel in Campbell differed from the application of the doctrine in Rubish.
In Rubish promissory estoppel was applied defensively.' 1 2 Defendant was al-
lowed to assert a defense of promissory estoppel based on plaintiff's alleged
waiver of the right to require written notice under the terms of the lease. 13
Thus, the doctrine of promissory estoppel was asserted to prevent the promisor
from asserting a legal right he had promised explicitly or implicitly to forego.
101. Rubish, 306 N.C. at 429, 293 S.E.2d at 757.
102. Id at 418, 293 S.E.2d at 751.
103. Id at 423, 293 S.E.2d at 754.
104. Id at 424, 293 S.E.2d at 754.
105. Id
106. Id at 429, 293 S.E.2d at 757.
107. Id at 427, 293 S.E.2d at 756.
108. Id at 431, 293 S.E.2d at 758. Although the Rubish court relied on case law to support its
holding, the court also cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, § 90.
Rubish, 306 N.C. at 433, 293 S.E.2d at 759.
109. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 931.
110. Id at 932.
111. Id (citing Rubish, 306 N.C. at 427, 293 S.E.2d at 755-56).
112. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
113. Rub14 306 N.C. at 431, 293 S.E.2d at 758.
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In Campbell, however, promissory estoppel was invoked to make an offer ir-
revocable based on the action of the offeree in justifiable and detrimental reli-
ance on the offer.'1 4 Therefore, in Campbell the doctrine of promissory
estoppel was used affirmatively to create a cause of action.
The distinction between the two applications of the doctrine is significant.
North Carolina precedent and dicta support the application of promissory es-
toppel only in the defensive context.115 By allowing promissory estoppel to
affirmatively create a cause of action the court of appeals sanctioned a use of
the doctrine that is not supported by North Carolina precedent. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts and the majority of cases from other jurisdictions,
however, have approved the use of promissory estoppel to create a cause of
action. 1 6 Thus, although arguably not supported by North Carolina law, the
holding of the court of appeals is in accord with legal authority in the majority
of jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue.
Having found the doctrine of promissory estoppel available under North
Carolina law, the court of appeals turned to the second issue. This issue was
raised by Virginia Metal's assertion that, even if the court found that a prom-
ise was made, the promise was not enforceable since it was not in writing as
required by the statute of frauds.117 Because Virginia Metal's bid involved the
sale of goods, the statute of frauds provision of the UCC, section 2-201, con-
trolled. Although North Carolina courts have allowed equitable estoppel to
overcome the general statute of frauds,118 whether estoppel of any kind is
available to overcome the statute of frauds provision of the UCC has not been
addressed by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
In Campbell the court of appeals acknowledged that a split of authority
exists in decisions from other states. 1 9 The court cited various cases that al-
lowed the estoppel provision of section 1-103 of the UCC to overcome the
statute of frauds provision of the UCC. 120 The court also cited cases that re-
fused to allow promissory estoppel to overcome the statute of frauds in cases
of obvious subcontractor bidding error-a strict interpretation of the exceptions
to the statute of frauds of the UCC or a refusal to accept Restatement (Second)
of Contracts section 139.121 The opinion in Campbell, however, merely ac-
knowledged these holdings without examining their merits or their underlying
reasoning. Instead, the court of appeals based its decision to allow promissory
estoppel to overcome Virginia Metal's statute of frauds defense on the North
Carolina Supreme Court's apparent approval of Restatement (Second) of Con-
114. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 932.
115. See supra notes 28, 112 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
117. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 932. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
118. "[I]n proper cases, an estoppel predicated upon grounds of silence or fraud may override
the statute of frauds." Callahan v. Arenson, 239 N.C. 619, 626, 80 S.E.2d 619, 625 (1954); see also
McKinley v. Hinnant, 242 N.C. 245, 87 S.E.2d 568 (1955); Dunn v. Dunn, 24 N.C. App. 713, 212
S.E.2d 40, cert. denied 287 N.C. 258, 214 S.E.2d 430 (1975).
119. Campbell, 708 F.2d at 932-33.
120. Id.
121. Id
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tracts section 139, which allows promissory estoppel to defeat the writing re-
quirement of the Statute of Frauds.' 22 The North Carolina Supreme Court
had approved the use of promissory estoppel to overcome the general statute
of frauds in the context of evidence relating to waiver of a notice provision of a
lease, 123 adopting the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in
this narrow context. 124 Thus, the court of appeals broadened the application
of promissory estoppel to overcome the statute of frauds requirement to cases
governed by the UCC. Allowing promissory estoppel to overcome the statute
of frauds provision of the UCC is controversial, but consistent with the view of
the majority of courts and legal authorities. 125 The courts of other states, once
allowing promissory estoppel to overcome the general statute of frauds, often
have found no reason not to extend that holding beyond the general statute of
frauds. 126 Therefore, the holding in Campbell arguably is in accord with the
view that the North Carolina courts would adopt if faced with this issue.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is of relatively recent origin. As a
result, the definition and extent of application of the doctrine have been con-
troversial and unsettled. This Note has examined the application of the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel in two specific situations: construction bidding
cases and cases in which the doctrine is used to overcome the statute of frauds
provision of the UCC. The court of appeals in Campbellheld that promissory
estoppel was available to render a subcontractor's bid irrevocable based on the
general contractor's detrimental reliance on the subcontractor's bid. The court
held further that promissory estoppel was available to overcome the statute of
frauds provision of the UCC. Although the holdings are consistent with the
view of most legal authorities and the majority of other jurisdictions, the
court's decision expanded the use of the doctrine in North Carolina. The
holdings in Campbell, however, represent a logical extension of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel in North Carolina law. Permitting the use of promissory
estoppel in construction bidding cases provides the courts with a useful doc-
trine for achieving equitable results in these often troublesome cases.
JANINE MCPETERS MURPHY
122. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. In Rubish, 306 N.C. at 433, 293 S.E.2d at 759,
the statute of frauds had been invoked to exclude testimony that allegedly demonstrated the oral
modification of a lease. The North Carolina Supreme Court found that the evidence arguably
indicated an implied promise to forego the notice requirement and that such a promise was en-
forceable only if it induced detrimental reliance by the defendant notwithstanding the writing
requirement of the Statute of Frauds. The North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 10, § 139 was consistent with North Carolina
cases that recognized exceptions to the Statute of Frauds.
123. Rubish, 306 N.C. at 433, 293 S.E.2d at 759; see supra note 122.
124. Rubish, 306 N.C. at 433, 293 S.E.2d at 759; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 90, 139 (1981).
125. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
126. Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1979). One widely
cited and highly controversial case, C. R. Fedrick Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 552 F.2d 852 (9th
Cir. 1977), is contra.
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